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153 
KALININGRAD IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY—INDEPENDENCE,  
SEMI-AUTONOMY, OR CONTINUED  
SECOND-CLASS CITIZENSHIP? 
Königsberg, East Prussia—April 9, 1945. One hundred ten thousand 
Nazi and Soviet soldiers have perished in the struggle for the city and the 
surrounding region;
1
 thirty to thirty-five thousand Nazi soldiers surrender 
to the Soviet Red Army after a months-long siege;
2
 the foundation is laid 
for an ongoing international question spanning more than half a century.
3
 
Following World War II, the victorious Allies agreed at the Potsdam 
Conference to ―the proposal of the Soviet Government concerning the 
ultimate transfer to the Soviet Union of the city of Königsberg and the area 
adjacent to it. . . . subject to expert examination of the actual frontier.‖4 
 
 
 1. See ISABEL DENNY, THE FALL OF HITLER‘S FORTRESS CITY: THE BATTLE FOR KÖNIGSBERG, 
1945, at 226–27 (2007).  
 2. Id. at 15. 
 3. The surrender of Kaliningrad to Soviet forces set into motion a conflict over the identity and 
political and economic policies of the region that continues to the present day. Policy Memorandum 
No. 172, Alexander Sergounin, Nizhny Novgorod Linguistic University, for the Program on New 
Approaches to Research and Security in Eurasia, Russia and the European Union: The Case of 
Kaliningrad 1 (Oct. 2000), https://gushare.georgetown.edu/eurasianstrategy/Memos/2000/pm_0172. 
pdf.  
The new geopolitical situation [the creation of the exclave after the fall of the Soviet Union] 
led to numerous problems in areas such as supplying the region with basic provisions, energy, 
raw materials and equipment, transport, communications, military transit, and travel. It was 
necessary to create a new customs, border-crossing and consular infrastructure in the region. 
Feelings of isolation from ―mainland Russia‖ have become widespread in Kaliningrad. 
Id. 
 4. Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, 1945, Protocol of Proceedings, U.S.-U.K.-U.S.S.R. part V, 
Aug. 2, 1945, 3 CHARLES I. BEVANS, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1776–1949, at 1207 [hereinafter Potsdam Agreement]. The final wording 
adopted at the Potsdam Conference read:  
 The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government to the effect that 
pending the final determination of territorial questions at the peace settlement, the section of 
the western frontier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which is adjacent to the Baltic 
Sea should pass from a point on the eastern shore of the Bay of Danzig to the east, north of 
Braunsberg-Goldap, to the meeting point of the frontiers of Lithuania, the Polish Republic 
and East Prussia.  
 The Conference has agreed in principle to the proposal of the Soviet Government 
concerning the ultimate transfer to the Soviet Union of the City of Koenigsberg and the area 
adjacent to it as described above subject to expert examination of the actual frontier.  
 The President of the United States and the British Prime Minister have declared that they 
will support the proposal of the Conference at the forthcoming peace settlement.  
Id. The ―forthcoming peace settlement‖ never occurred. Thus, the current U.S. position is that Russia 
only maintains de facto possession of Kaliningrad. See infra note 6. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
154 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 9:153 
 
 
 
 
The Soviets subsequently renamed the city and its surrounding region 
―Kaliningrad‖5 and began remaking the area in the Soviet image.6  
Three years after Potsdam, in 1948, the Soviet government removed 
twenty thousand German citizens from the region,
7
 the remnants of a 1945 
 
 
 5. RICHARD J. KRICKUS, THE KALININGRAD QUESTION 39 (2002).  
 On July 4 of the following year [1946], Konigsberg was renamed Kaliningrad to honor 
the recently deceased Soviet President Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin, who never visited the 
place. . . .  
 The Soviets consigned German name-places to the memory hole of history with 
Orwellian zeal and replaced them with Russian names and designations. Tilsit was renamed 
Sovietsk, Gumbinnen was called Gusevo, and so on. In Kaliningrad‘s schools, little or no 
mention was made of the areas in the German past except in discussions of how it figured into 
the ―Great Patriotic War,‖ and the Soviet Union‘s successful campaign against Hitler‘s forces 
in the area. Students were taught that East Prussia had been a Slavic homeland for centuries. 
Id. This Note will refer to the region surrounding the town of Kaliningrad as the ―Kaliningrad region,‖ 
―Kaliningrad Oblast‖ (post-World War II), or simply ―Kaliningrad,‖ whereas the town will be referred 
to as ―Kaliningrad city,‖ or ―Kaliningrad town.‖ 
 6. See DENNY, supra note 1, at 235.  
 The Russianisation of Königsberg began even before the final surrender on 8 May 1945. 
Loudspeakers were installed on every corner which blared out Russian music. Within a few 
days of the fall of the city, direction signs and place names in German were torn down and 
replaced by new ones in Russian script. As Russians arrived in the town, those Germans who 
still had somewhere to live were turned out of their homes and forced to find shelter in 
bombed-out cellars without heating, lighting, or water. 
Id. 
 However, Russia currently possesses only de facto control of the Kaliningrad Oblast because 
certain provisions of the Potsdam Conference have not been met. According to the Potsdam 
Conference, de jure control of the region will only pass to Russia once a peace treaty between the 
Allies and the Axis powers is signed (specifically the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, the 
United States, and Germany). The official position of the United States is that Russia maintains only 
de facto control of the Kaliningrad region, but the United States has neglected to push the issue of 
de jure control. For a discussion of the U.S. position on de jure versus de facto control of Kaliningrad, 
see KRICKUS, supra note 5, at 2–4.  
 7. Evidence of post-war executions of German citizens by Russian forces is still being 
uncovered. As of January 2009, the most recent discovery was that of a mass grave of eighteen 
hundred German citizens near the East Prussian city of Marienburg (now the Polish city of Malbork). 
See WWII-Era Mass Grave Believed to Contain 1,800 Germans, FOX NEWS, Jan. 12, 2009, http:// 
www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,479253,00.html. See also DENNY, supra note 1, at 232–35.  
 Soldiers captured by the Red Army and the civilians of Königsberg who were considered 
fit were rounded up to be sent to labour camps in Russia. The transportation of East Prussian 
people to the USSR had started in 1944 and by mid-February 1945, several weeks before the 
fall of Königsberg, more than 28,000 had already been sent into the Soviet Union in order to 
strengthen the severely depleted Russian labour force. Many were taken first to Insterburg or 
Georgenburg as both these towns were near the Russian border and were railheads. From 
there they were then sent to Siberia, beyond the Ural Mountains. The journey took over two 
weeks in open carts and survivors recall their hunger and the way they were packed together 
so tightly that at first no one could stand up. They were given no food and many died from 
hunger or from typhus. Those who survived the journey were mainly those who had managed 
to bring a little of their own food with them. For the survivors, their internment in labour 
camps, where they did heavy jobs, particularly tree felling, lasted for four or five years. The 
majority did not return. In addition to taking labour, the Russians also dismantled what little 
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population of more than one hundred thousand.
8
 For the next fifty years, 
until its collapse in the early 1990s, the Soviet Union followed the 
historical Russian pattern of ―Russification‖ through immigration and 
education.
9
 By the time of the Soviet collapse, the population of 
Kaliningrad had been transformed from its almost exclusively German 
composition pre-World War II
10
 to one consisting of more than seventy-
eight percent ethnic Russians.
11
  
After the fall of the Soviet Union, Kaliningrad, still under the de facto 
control of Russia, found itself surrounded by Poland and Lithuania with no 
terra firma link to the Russian Federation—Kaliningrad became an island. 
As a result, the past decade and a half have witnessed negotiations and 
policy plans between Kaliningrad and Lithuania, Poland, Germany, the 
European Union, and the Russian Federation.
12
  
Immediately after the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1992, 
independence for Kaliningrad was, and is still, openly discussed,
13
 and 
rumors circulated that Russia might sell the region to Germany in 
exchange for debt forgiveness.
14
 As of 2002, however, Germany showed 
no interest in purchasing the region despite its strong historical and 
cultural ties and claims to the region.
15
 Further, because of its exclave 
status, Russia‘s economic policies have often not served Kaliningrad‘s 
 
 
machinery and industrial plant remained intact. Farms in the surrounding countryside were 
plundered. The Russians seized stocks of cereals and potatoes and drove herds of cattle 
towards the Russian border. 
Id. at 232–33 (footnote omitted). 
 8. MICHAEL WIECK, A CHILDHOOD UNDER HITLER AND STALIN: MEMOIRS OF A ―CERTIFIED 
JEW‖ 161, Illustration No. 33 (Penny Milbouer trans., 2003). 
 9. See supra notes 5–7. 
 10. KRICKUS, supra note 5, at 37. The pre-war population of East Prussia was 2.47 million. Id. 
This increased to over 2.65 million after the German invasion of the Soviet Union, and shrank to 
600,000 after April 1945 when the Soviet army invaded East Prussia. Id. 
 11. ―The population is multinational, with representatives of 97 different nationalities and ethnic 
groups. Russians make up more than 78% of the population, Belarussians more than 8%, Ukrainians 
more than 7%, Lithuanians more than 2%, Germans 0.6%, Poles 0.5%, and other nationalities about 
3%.‖ Kaliningrad Region: General Information, KOMMERSANT (Russ.), http://www.kommersant.com/ 
t-43/r_5/n_386/Kaliningrad_Region (last visited Jan. 29, 2009) [hereinafter Kaliningrad Region]. See 
also infra notes 39 and 40. 
 12. The most relevant example of these policy plans is the Northern Dimension Action Plan, an 
inter-disciplinary revitalization plan devised by the EU and Russia. The plan‘s projects affecting 
Kaliningrad include transportation infrastructure modernization, environmental protection, education, 
healthcare, trade and investment, increased crime fighting and border controls, and cross-border 
cooperation. See Sergounin, supra note 3, at 4–6. 
 13. Natalya Arkhangelskaya, A Suitcase Without a Handle, EXPERT MAG. (Russ.), Sept. 16, 
2002, http://eng.expert.ru/politics/34kalinin.htm. 
 14. Id. 
 15. KRICKUS, supra note 5, at 1–2. In 1990, Germany ―asserted that it no longer claimed East 
Prussia.‖ Id. at 2. 
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best economic interests, causing Kaliningraders to suffer.
16
 Will a 
resurgent Russia under President Dmitry Medvedev (with Vladimir Putin 
in the shadows) govern the economic playbook for the Kaliningrad Oblast, 
or will Russia grant it the opportunity to function as a semi-autonomous 
region in determining its economic future? The central question today is 
not who will rule the region in the coming years,
17
 but rather who will 
establish the region‘s economic rules for the foreseeable future. 
This Note examines these two possibilities and argues that allowing 
Kaliningrad to determine its economic (and possibly, political) future is, as 
a whole, in the best interests of Kaliningrad, Russia, their immediate 
neighbors, and the European Union (―EU‖). There are five categories of 
reasons in support of this argument: historical, socio-cultural, economic 
and legal, and Russian interests in granting Kaliningrad semi-autonomy or 
independence. 
A semi-autonomous Kaliningrad Oblast could maintain some hard ties 
with Russia. For example, it might allow the Russian fleet to use the 
warm-water port facilities at Baltiysk, or provide Moscow with limited tax 
receipts, perhaps in the form of a lease payment such as that provided for 
by the agreement between the United Kingdom and China concerning 
Hong Kong.
18
 Local authorities, however, could be granted the authority to 
develop and implement economic policy for the region and to deal directly 
 
 
 16. See infra Part III. 
 17. Id. Further soft aggression by Russia in the form of cutting off gas deliveries to entire nations 
or regions, see Europe Shivers as Russia Cuts Gas Shipments, MSNBC, Jan. 7, 2009, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28515983; see also Europe Cuts Ukraine Gas Supplies, BBC NEWS, 
Jan. 1, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4572712.stm, or hard aggression such as Russia‘s 
invasion of Georgia in August of 2008, see Russian Invasion of Georgia Shattered Old Assumptions, 
Prompts New Concerns, AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE, Mar. 25, 2009, http://www.global 
security.org/military/library/news/2009/03/mil-090325-afps04.htm, could possibly encourage U.S. 
leaders to pursue a harder line with Russia, but this is doubtful if the first eight months of President 
Barack Obama‘s foreign policy are an indication of the rest of his time in office. One example is the 
abandonment of a proposed land-based ballistic missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic in 
exchange for nebulous promises from Russia for increased Russian diplomatic pressure on Iran‘s 
nuclear program. President Obama‘s administration argued that such a system was unnecessary and 
that its purpose could be fulfilled by ship-based interceptors. See Q&A: US Missile Defense, BBC 
NEWS, Sept. 20, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6720153.stm. This view is vigorously 
opposed by those who see the move as abandoning key Eastern European allies and rewarding Russia 
for its intransigence. See Obama’s Strategic Confusion, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2009, http://online.wsj. 
com/article/SB10001424052970204518504574423822003473450.html. See also Lieberman: Obama’s 
Missile Defense Cuts Weaken U.S., Allies, NEWSMAX, Apr. 20, 2009, http://www.newsmax.com/ 
headlines/lieberman_missile_defense/2009/04/07/200623.html. It is the author‘s opinion that, based 
upon the actions described above, an Obama State Department might even grant de jure recognition of 
Russia‘s control of the Kaliningrad Oblast in exchange for resolution of an EU-Russian crisis during 
President Obama‘s term in office. 
 18. See Sergounin, supra note 3, at 3. See also Denny, supra note 1, at 20 (explaining that 
Moscow wants the region to become the Russian Hong Kong). 
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with Kaliningrad‘s neighbors, Lithuania, Poland, and the EU at-large, on 
visa, trade issues, etc. Semi-autonomy or full independence would be 
determined by the holding of a plebiscite at a date mutually determined by 
local authorities and the Russian government. 
I. HISTORICAL REASONS FOR SEMI-AUTONOMY 
The Kaliningrad region has a history of changing allegiances and 
governing structures that spans more than a century.
19
 Teutonic Knights 
ruled East Prussia from the thirteenth century until the mid-eighteenth 
century, during which time the city of Königsberg functioned as a 
Hanseatic regional trade center, the medieval equivalent to a modern-day 
Hong Kong.
20
 In the eighteenth century, the region became part of Prussia, 
and during Napoleon‘s 1806 invasion, it replaced Berlin as the Prussian 
seat of power.
21
 Prussia served as the starting point from which Chancellor 
Otto von Bismarck built the German Empire in 1871.
22
 Following World 
War I, the Kaliningrad region, then known as East Prussia, was cut off 
from Weimar Germany in order to allow Poland access to the Baltic Sea,
23
 
and a northern portion of the province was obtained by Lithuania.
24
 
Though largely ethnically and culturally German, the province did not 
regain land ties with Germany until the conquest of Poland in 1939.
25
 
From 1939 to 1945, the SS and Gestapo ―colonized‖ the area surrounding 
Kaliningrad in an attempt to reduce perceived Slavic control under Adolf 
Hitler‘s concept of Lebensraum for the German people.26  
 
 
 19. Below is a timeline of Kaliningrad‘s history over the last century and a half. 
1878—1919: Königsberg is the capital city of East Prussia, a state in the German Empire 
1919—1939: East Prussia is separated from Weimar Germany by the Treaty of Versailles 
1939—1945: East Prussia is connected to Nazi Germany 
1946: Soviet Union annexes East Prussia and renames the region Kaliningrad 
1946—1991: Kaliningrad is part of the Soviet Union 
1991: Lithuania declares independence and Kaliningrad is once again an exclave, this time of 
the Russian Federation 
DENNY, supra note 1, at 14–16, 236. 
 20. DENNY, supra note 1, at 13–14, 31. For an excellent, brief overview of Königsberg‘s 
medieval history, see KRICKUS, supra note 5, at 17–19. The Hanseatic League consisted of merchant 
traders that controlled most of the commodities traded in North Germany and the Eastern Baltic. 
DENNY, supra note 1, at 241 n.14. 
 21. KRICKUS, supra note 5, at 20.  
 22. See id. at 21. 
 23. DENNY, supra note 1, at 38.  
 24. See KRICKUS, supra note 5, at 23–24.  
 25. See id. 
 26. For a discussion of Adolf Hitler‘s Lebensraum policies in Poland, see 2 NORMAN RICH, 
HITLER‘S WAR AIMS: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NEW ORDER 68–105 (1974). Lebensraum, German 
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Following the end of World War II, the Soviets ethnically cleansed the 
area
27
 and developed it into ―one of the most highly militarized areas in 
Europe.‖28 Even though it was not connected physically with Russia, the 
Kaliningrad Oblast was still considered part of Russia proper and not a 
piece of any Baltic or Eastern European satellite.
29
  
Thus, examination of Kaliningrad from a historical perspective reveals 
a pattern of geographical isolation that lends itself to semi-autonomous 
economic rule. The creation of the Polish Corridor during the 1920s and 
1930s separated the Kaliningrad region geographically and economically 
from Weimar Germany.
30
 Therefore, Kaliningrad functioned in many 
ways as a de facto semi-autonomous state for nearly twenty years simply 
due to its lack of a terra firma connection to the German Fatherland. 
Furthermore, the Kaliningrad region‘s six-hundred-year existence as an 
independent state demonstrates that semi-autonomous rule would not be a 
new idea to press upon a region with artificially created boundaries. 
Indeed, the region‘s troubled history offers precedent for the creation of a 
semi-autonomous region in the Kaliningrad Oblast with hard ties to Russia 
(i.e., stationing of Russia‘s Baltic Fleet in Kaliningrad), but only soft 
economic ties. 
II. SOCIO-CULTURAL REASONS FOR SEMI-AUTONOMY 
As a result of the changes of the past one hundred years, the 
Kaliningrad Oblast has developed a unique sense of place on the European 
continent.
31
 Today the region contains a seventy-eight percent Russian 
 
 
for ―living space,‖ was the belief held by Hitler and the Nazis that Germany needed more space in 
order to survive. Accordingly, the Nazis embarked on an effort to gain areas of western Russia. Jeremy 
Noakes, Hitler and ‘Lebensraum’ in the East, BBC, May 11, 2004, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ 
worldwars/wwtwo/hitler_lebensraum_01.shtml. 
 27. See supra notes 5 and 7. 
 28. Sergounin, supra note 3, at 1. In the Kaliningrad region, the Baltic Fleet maintained its only 
year-round warm water port, and the Soviet submarine fleet used Baltijsk as a rally point for missions 
into Western European waters. Id. 
 In fact, Baltisjk was the home port for the Soviet submarine whose defection to Sweden served as 
the factual basis for Tom Clancy‘s novel, The Hunt for Red October. KRICKUS, supra note 5, at 42. 
 29. See DENNY, supra note 1, at 237. See also id. at 235–40 (detailing several first-hand accounts 
of the Sovietization of the Kaliningrad region in the years following World War II); supra notes 5 and 
7. 
 30. See DENNY, supra note 1, at 38. The Polish Corridor, which ran from the northern part of the 
River Vistula to Danzig, was created by the makers of the Versailles Treaty to give Poland access to 
the Baltic. Id. 
 31. Id. at 30. For a social history of the Kaliningrad area prior to World War II, see id. One of 
Denny‘s examples describes how from the sixteenth century until World War II, a wind band climbed 
to the top of a tower in the Königsberg castle and played a morning and evening greeting. Id. In 
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majority,
32
 but still has German cultural influences.
33
 However, the 
region‘s leaders have vowed to rebuild its capital city of Kaliningrad in the 
pattern of a modern European city.
34
 Such an attitude reflects 
Kaliningraders‘ lack of strong identification with either of the two nations 
that have controlled the area in the past century.
35
 
During the Soviet period, much of Kaliningrad‘s population consisted 
of military personnel and their dependents.
36
 As a result, it failed to 
develop a new cultural identity after the expulsion of its native East 
Prussian occupants.
37
 In fact, Soviet officers and their families often 
referred to the Kaliningrad Oblast as ―the West‖ during their deployments 
to the region.
38
 In other words, Soviet officers and civilians felt as if they 
were leaving Russia and going to a more European nation. Today, the 
population
39
 is approximately eighty percent ethnically Russian, eight 
percent Belarusian, seven percent Ukranian, two percent Lithuanian, less 
than one percent German,
40
 and one-half percent Polish.
41
 These figures 
 
 
addition, Denny includes several pre-WWII, post-WWII, and current photos of Kaliningrad for 
comparison. Id. at 97–113. 
 32. Supra note 11; infra notes 39 and 40. 
 33. For example, the Königsberg Cathedral has now been restored to its former glory. DENNY, 
supra note 1, at 112. The Cathedral possesses not only religious significance for Germans, but it is also 
where William I of Prussia was crowned in 1861. Infra note 105. Perhaps of even more cultural 
significance, renowned philosopher Immanuel Kant is entombed in the Cathedral. KRICKUS, supra 
note 5, at 39. In the 1960s the West German government offered to rebuild the ancient Königsberg 
Castle at the center of Kaliningrad. Id. at 38. ―Leonid Brezhnev refused the offer. Instead he ordered 
the remnants of the castle be removed and a new structure, the House of Soviets, be constructed on the 
site. Today visitors to the city marvel at that architectural monstrosity, which has never been 
occupied.‖ Id. 
 34. Laura Sheeter, Kaliningrad Erases Stains of Past, BBC NEWS, Oct. 16, 2006, http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6048708.stm. See also Arkhangelskaya, supra note 13. 
 35. Alexander Sergounin, a scholar at Nizhny Novgorod Linguistic University admits that 
―Kaliningrad now is perceived as the most pro-Western and cosmopolitan region in the country‖ and 
that ―Kaliningrad exemplifies the most dramatic change in the economy, society, foreign policy and 
mentality of any region in post-Communist Russia.‖ Sergounin, supra note 3, at 2. 
 Stephen Dewar, a member of Europe‘s Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (―TACIS‖) commission, writes that Kalingingrad suffers from a ―lingering identity crisis.‖ 
Stephen Dewar, Why Kaliningrad is ―Unique‖ in the Russian Federation (June 1998) (unpublished 
document adapted from the June 1998 TACIS report to Brussels, available in KRICKUS, supra note 5, 
at 118, 129). 
 36. KRICKUS, supra note 5, at 40–41. 
 37. Id.  
 38. Id. at 42. 
 39. The population of Kaliningrad is still less than it was before World War II. See Ingmar 
Oldberg, Kaliningrad: Problems and Prospects, in KALININGRAD: THE EUROPEAN AMBER REGION 1, 
3 (Pertti Joenniemi & Jan Prawitz eds., 1998). 
 40. In addition to a small number of East Prussians moving back to their homeland, Volga 
Germans immigrated to Kaliningrad in the late 1980s from Kazakhstan and Central Asia. Oldberg, 
supra note 39, at 17. Estimates of the number of Volga Germans in Kaliningrad range from five 
thousand to as many as twenty thousand. Id. at 18. Even though foreign ethnic Germans are entitled to 
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are deceptive as to the cultural identity of Kaliningrad citizens because ―an 
estimated 70 per cent have never been to Russia proper.‖42 One scholar of 
the Kaliningrad issue asserts that the difficulties of traveling between 
Russia and Kaliningrad and the fact that more Kaliningraders have visited 
Europe than have visited Russia have contributed to an ―island 
psychology.‖43 This identity crisis44 has been sharpened by the expansion 
of the EU and its attendant visa issues.
45
  
While the Kaliningrad Oblast will retain an ethnically Russian majority 
for the foreseeable future,
46
 this majority will be eroded by immigration
47
 
and other demographic trends.
48
 As discussed, even though the population 
is ethnically Russian, it does not necessarily identify itself as culturally 
Russian. Kaliningrad‘s residents often feel that Moscow treats them like 
second-class citizens.
49
 Moscow‘s treatment of the Kaliningrad Oblast will 
 
 
citizenship under German federal law, in the 1990s the German government offered subsidies to Volga 
and Siberian Germans to encourage them to remain in Russia, chiefly due to the economic difficulties 
Germany encountered during the re-unification period. See Richard C. Morais & Andreas Wildhagen, 
Home Sweet Volga: Catherine the Great Invited the Germans to Russia. Boris Yeltsin Intends to Keep 
Them There, FORBES, Feb. 3, 1992, at 45. Thus, many of those Volga and Siberian Germans 
receiving subsidies chose to move to Kaliningrad, a historically German region. See Oldberg, supra 
note 39, at 17–18 (discussing this immigration movement and its effects). See also Anatoly Trynkov, 
The Region’s Security: An Expert View from Moscow, in KALININGRAD: THE EUROPEAN AMBER 
REGION 126–27 (Pertti Joenniemi & Jan Prawitz eds., 1998).  
 41. See supra note 11. 
 42. Zdzislaw Lachowski, Whither Kaliningrad?, STOCKHOLM INT‘L PEACE RESEARCH INST., 
Sept. 23, 2004, at 3, http://archives.sipri.org/contents/worldsec/kaliningrad.pdf. 
 43. Id.; see also supra note 35. 
 44. See Lachowski, supra note 42, at 3. Lachowski discusses the visa issues between Russia and 
the EU as well as Kaliningrad‘s socio-cultural identity crisis in the latter half of his essay. Id. at 3–4. 
He describes the socio-cultural trend of Kaliningraders as that of an ―island psychology‖ as well as 
having ―feelings of being neglected by Moscow.‖ Id. at 3. 
 45. Id. at 3–4. For further discussion of the visa issue and the enlargement of the Schengen Zone, 
see Alexey Ignatiev & Petr Shopin, Kaliningrad in the Context of EU-Russia Relations, RUSS. 
ANALYTICAL DIGEST, Feb. 20, 2007, at 16, available at http://www.res.ethz.ch/analysis/rad/index.cfm 
(follow ―No. 15: Russia‘s Relations to Poland and Belarus; The Issue of Kaliningrad‖ hyperlink). 
 46. Interestingly, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin‘s mother-in-law is a resident of the region. 
KRICKUS, supra note 5, at 125. 
 47. See Sheeter, supra note 34. Economic Minister Felix Lapin stated, ―We‘re advertising all 
over the former Soviet Union, among the Russian diaspora in Kazakhstan and in the Caucasus.‖ Id. 
 48. Russia is experiencing the new phenomenon of hypermortality in which its ―men are dying 3-
5 times and Russian women two times higher than in countries with similar economic development.‖ 
Martin Walker, Russia’s ‘Hypermortality’, UNITED PRESS INT‘L, May 27, 2008, http://www.upi. 
com/Emerging_Threats/2008/05/27/Walkers_World_Russias_hypermortality/UPI-16941211901890. 
By 2020, the working age population will fall by a million people annually. 
 49. After Russia‘s economic crisis in 1998, Kaliningraders called for semi-autonomy in 
economic affairs. KRICKUS, supra note 5, at 100–02. 
 There were signs of growing disenchantment among the population at the grass roots but 
they were no different in nature nor magnitude than popular unrest in other areas of Russia 
and they were benign and restricted to rhetoric. Nonetheless, on September 7, trade union 
leaders wrote letters to both President Yeltsin and Governor Gorbenko demanding that they 
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be addressed in the next section on law and economics. Because of this 
disassociation, semi-autonomy or full independence would not drastically 
change Kaliningrad‘s cultural identity. Indeed, semi-autonomy or 
independence might be the best way to create a common Kaliningradian 
culture. The citizens would identify more closely with a government and 
nation that exists in their own backyard than with one thousands of 
kilometers away, across the borders of another nation. Thus, the people of 
Kaliningrad should have the opportunity to decide whether it is a more 
European nation or a more Russian one. A plebiscite on semi-autonomy 
would allow Kaliningraders to decide if they want to control their own 
fate, but still maintain some ties with Russia; if they want to completely 
sever those ties with Russia and achieve full independence; or if they wish 
to maintain the status quo as Russia‘s ―redheaded step-child.‖  
III. ECONOMIC AND LEGAL REASONS FOR SEMI-AUTONOMY 
The Kaliningrad Oblast has experienced many legal structures since the 
early 1990s, all of which have had a direct impact on the area‘s economic 
well-being. This situation has deterred foreign investors from directing 
investment into the region.
50
 As demonstrated by the People‘s Republic of 
China, foreign investment is crucial to a region‘s economic development, 
particularly when that region formerly functioned as a command 
economy.
51
 The Kaliningrad Oblast‘s economy has undergone three 
 
 
resign from office and Kaliningrad given a new change in status. The latter reference was in 
keeping with demands from officials in the region that it be granted control over its own 
affairs.  
Id. at 102 (footnotes omitted). 
 50. See Lachowski, supra note 42, at 1–2. 
 51. See Bin Xue Sang, Pudong: Another Special Economic Zone in China?, 14 NW. J. INT‘L L. & 
BUS. 130–60 (1993) (describing in detail some of the policies enacted by the Chinese government in 
the early 1990s to encourage growth in the Pudong New Area). 
 The Pudong New Area is across the Huangpu River in Shanghai and means literally ―east of the 
river.‖ URBANANATOMY: SHANGHAI 2008, at 106 (Nick Land et al. eds., 1st ed. 2008). The area was 
once a vast collection of swampy farmland, but it was designated a Special Economic Zone in the 
1990s by Deng Xiaopeng in the second wave of his economic reforms. Id. From 1990–2000, the 
Chinese government poured 130 million Renminbi (approximately $17.3 million USD) into 
infrastructure projects within Pudong and the area is now a showcase for what China is striving to 
become—a glittering modern economic jewel. Id. 
 A few facts about Pudong highlight the success of this endeavor: (1) the world‘s highest hotel is 
located there; (2) Shanghai‘s new international airport is in Pudong, and it is now the sixth largest 
cargo handler in the world; (3) three of Asia‘s (and the world‘s) tallest buildings are located there; (4) 
the world‘s only Maglev train (designed by German engineers and, as experienced by the author, able 
to hit speeds in excess of 270 mph on its fifteen-minute trip into Shanghai) operates between the 
airport and a terminal in the city. Id. at 106, 108, 117. The Pudong New Area‘s English language 
government website, http://english.pudong.gov.cn, illustrates the vast amount of economic 
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changes to its economic structures since 1992.
52
 Initially, it was declared a 
Free Economic Zone,
53
 but transitioned into a Special Economic Zone in 
1996,
54
 and then was modified again in 2006.
55
 While each modification 
has included some improvements, the volatility of changes to 
Kaliningrad‘s economic legal structure has not been conducive to foreign 
investment.
56
 Likewise, the last two changes to the Special Economic 
Zone have not enhanced Kaliningrad‘s ability to compete with its 
neighbors or other areas of the Russian Federation.
57
 Currently, 
Kaliningrad is entering its fourth economic legal restructuring, as Russia‘s 
entrance into the World Trade Organization (―WTO‖) nullifies some of the 
provisions of Kaliningrad‘s 2006 Special Economic Zone status.58 
A. Customs, Tariffs, Visas, and Semi-autonomy 
Russia‘s forthcoming accession to the WTO will end many of the 
preferential importation duties that Kaliningrad has enjoyed.
59
 Since 1996, 
Kaliningrad has functioned as the point of entry for much of Russia‘s trade 
with the European Union.
60
 As a result, Kaliningrad has been an attractive 
location for factories, which turn European raw materials and secondary 
 
 
development still occurring in the area as well as the government incentives that help drive that 
growth.  
 52. Ignatiev & Shopin, supra note 45, at 1. For discussion of the first two economic plans 
implemented in Kaliningrad through 1998, see Gennady M. Fyodorov, The Social and Economic 
Development of Kaliningrad, in KALININGRAD: THE EUROPEAN AMBER REGION 32–56 (Pertti 
Joenniemi & Jan Prawitz eds., 1998). 
 53. Ignatiev & Shopin, supra note 45, at 1. ―Free-trade status led to a sevenfold increase in the 
Kaliningrad region‘s foreign trade since 1992, reaching a total of $1.3 billion in 1996.‖ Fyodor I. 
Kushnirsky, Post-Soviet Attempts to Establish Free Economic Zones, 38 POST-SOVIET GEOGRAPHY & 
ECON. 144, 147 (1997) (citation omitted). See also KRICKUS, supra note 5, at 47–50.  
 54. Ignatiev & Shopin, supra note 45, at 14. 
 55. Id.  
 56. See Fyodorov, supra note 52, at 44–48. See also KRICKUS, supra note 5, at 94. ―Kaliningrad‘s 
economic prospects have suffered from constant policy reversals. According to [former Kaliningrad 
Governor] Matochkin, ‗In these past years . . . we have seen Moscow time and again present us with a 
decree with one hand and take it back with the other almost the following day.‘‖ Id. 
 57. Because of favorable customs benefits under both the Free Economic Zone and the first 
Special Economic Zone, Kaliningrad served as the entry point for European goods into the Russian 
market and for Russian goods into the European market. These tariff privileges will be reduced upon 
Russia‘s entry into the World Trade Organization and the loss will drastically affect Kaliningrad‘s 
ability to compete with Lithuania, Poland, and Russia. See Ignatiev & Shopin, supra note 45, at 16. See 
also Alexey Ignatiev, Kaliningrad Region: Economy Heading for the Future, BALTIC CLUB, Summer 
2007, at 8, available at http://www.kaliningradexpert.org/stuff/pubs/Kgd_Innovations_Article_ 
eng.pdf. 
 58. See Ignatiev, infra note 57, at 8 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. See also Ignatiev & Shopin, supra note 45, at 14. 
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goods into finished goods for the Russian market.
61
 The lowered customs 
duties on the raw materials from which products are made in Kalinigrad 
gives it a competitive advantage in the Russian market, outweighing 
additional transportation costs associated with producing something in 
Kaliningrad and then shipping it to Russia.
62
 Under the new WTO regime, 
the overall savings in transaction costs will be erased due to lowered 
customs duties throughout Russia, not just in the Kaliningrad exclave.
63
 
Additionally, because Kaliningrad is not a member of the EU, it does not 
enjoy open access to EU markets, putting it at a comparative disadvantage 
to its EU neighbors.
64
 Thus, Kaliningrad will no longer be as economically 
attractive as it was under the pre-WTO Special Economic Zone economy, 
in contrast to the benefits that will accrue to both Russia and the EU.
65
 
If the Kaliningrad Oblast were semi-autonomous, it would be able to 
determine its own customs duties in order to best position itself as a 
competitor in the Russian and EU markets.
66
 If semi-autonomous, 
Kaliningrad‘s government could lower or eliminate trade tariffs, thus 
opening Kaliningrad to the EU market and sparking increased industrial 
production through international trade. Under the current regime, however, 
Kaliningrad functions more as a ―redheaded step-child‖ than it does as a 
valued state of either the EU or Russia.
67
  
 
 
 61. For example, both BMW and Kia established factories in Kaliningrad during this period. 
Sergounin, supra note 3, at 2. 
 62. Ignatiev, supra note 57. 
 63. Id. at 8. 
 64. For a more detailed discussion of Kaliningrad‘s competitive disadvantage, see Ignatiev & 
Shopin, supra note 45, at 14. Scholars Alexey Ignatiev and Petr Shopin explain that because of 
Russia‘s entry into the EU, ―Kaliningrad-based businesses are in a less favorable competitive position 
than companies from other Russian regions (due to increased transit costs) and companies within the 
adjacent EU border areas, which enjoy direct access to EU markets and substantial development aid 
from EU funds.‖ Id.  
 65. See id. Ignatiev and Shopin argue that Kaliningrad is dually dependent on both Russia and 
the EU.  
Owing to its unique geopolitical location—Russia‘s ―island‖ in the midst of the EU—the 
region finds itself in a double dependency, relying simultaneously on decisions made by the 
Russian federal authorities and the European Union. In other words, conditions determining 
the region‘s socioeconomic development are regulated by Russian and EU legal acts. 
Id. 
 66. Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States (―TACIS‖) commission member, 
Stephen Dewar, argues that if Kaliningrad were to develop a large-scale and efficient transportation 
hub and bring international trade to the city, it could become an international trading post, much like it 
was during its early Hanseatic history. ―‗The third prong is to turn Kaliningrad into an international 
marketplace—to become the place which Russians and foreigners who do business together choose as 
their preferred location.‘‖ KRICKUS, supra note 5, at 126 (quoting Stephan Dewar, Future for 
Kaliningrad 1 (May 1998) (unpublished paper)). 
 67. See supra note 35. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, there have been numerous 
conflicts between local authorities in Kaliningrad and central authorities in Moscow. Local leaders 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
164 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 9:153 
 
 
 
 
Additionally, semi-autonomy would allow Kaliningrad to determine its 
visa system with regards to the EU and Russia. Visa regulation is another 
area in which Kaliningrad‘s geographical location increases the transaction 
costs of doing business with Russia or the EU.
68
 Under the current 
Schengen Treaty, Kaliningrad residents must obtain a thirty-five-euro 
Schengen visa to travel to Poland or Lithuania.
69
 A semi-autonomous 
Kaliningrad could apply to become a member of the EU or the Schengen 
Zone (a group of more than twenty European nations that allow passport-
free travel between countries),
70
 a maneuver that would lower the 
transaction costs of cross-border business or pleasure travel by 
Kaliningrad citizens.
71
 
B. International Investment and Semi-autonomy 
The most persuasive justification for a semi-autonomous Kaliningrad 
region flows from the nexus of law and economics, specifically, the need 
for a stable and predictable property rights regime. If Kaliningrad is to 
experience sustained long-term growth, then its legal system must 
demonstrate to investors that their investments will not be made worthless 
by yet another change in economic policy by Moscow. The only way to 
achieve this in the near future is for a semi-autonomous (or independent, 
with some favorable concessions to Russia) Kaliningrad to emerge that 
 
 
have often felt that, were they able to make economic decisions at the local level, the Kaliningrad 
economy would develop and grow much faster. Writing about the first Special Economic Zone 
legislation, Richard Krickus states: 
[I]n regions like Kaliningrad, local authorities and business leaders argued that Moscow had 
withheld legislation that enabled their economies to function effectively. The absence of 
enabling legislation to make the special economic zone a viable mechanism for economic 
development was a subject of complaint by a wide cross-section of elites in the region. 
KRICKUS, supra note 5, at 69. 
 Richard Krickus asserts the Moscow central authority‘s connections with the mob are also partly 
to blame for Kaliningrad‘s economic woes. Krickus believes that the first Free Economic Zone‘s 
failure was due to lobbying by members of the Russian Mafia when the cancellation of the Free 
Economic Zone was being considered. ―Lobbyists in St. Petersburg—specifically the Mafia and its 
friends in government—also used their political influence in the Russian Duma to cancel Kaliningrad‘s 
FEZ.‖ Id. at 49. 
 68. See Sergounin, supra note 3, at 2. 
 69. Russia-EU Agreement to Ease Visa Regime Comes into Force on June 1, KALININGRAD 
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, May 28, 2007, http://kaliningrad-rda.org/en/news/5400.php?back 
url=%2Fen%2Fnews%2Fnews.php%3FSHOWALL_1%3D1. 
 70. Schengen Enlargement Ceremony Held in Estonia, PEOPLE‘S DAILY ONLINE, Dec. 2, 2007, 
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90777/90853/6325502.html. 
 71. One argument raised in support of Kaliningrad‘s entry into the Schengen Zone is that ―an 
estimated 70 per cent [of Kaliningrad‘s residents] have never been to Russia proper, while one-third of 
them have travelled to other parts of Europe.‖ Lachowski, supra note 42, at 3.  
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can dictate legal and economic policy that is in the region‘s best interest. 
Every change issued from Moscow to the structure of Kaliningrad‘s 
economic status constitutes a taking of affected investors‘ investments. 
While it can be argued that any change in governmental policy is a taking 
on some level,
72
 the number of times that Russia‘s policy concerning 
Kaliningrad has changed and the unpredictability that accompanies such 
frequent changes has the potential to wipe out the value of a factory or 
business. 
Foreign investors have reason to distrust Russian actions.
73
 Under 
Kaliningrad‘s initial post-Soviet legal structures, specifically the first Free 
Economic Zone and the Special Economic Zone status of 1996, foreigners 
were prohibited from buying land in Kaliningrad.
74
 A flaring of tensions 
between Russia and the EU or China could encourage Russia to return to 
prohibitions on foreigners owning land in Kaliningrad, a less drastic 
choice than outright appropriation, but a serious action nonetheless.
75
 
IV. RUSSIAN INTERESTS REGARDING SEMI-AUTONOMY 
Finally, Russia has an interest in declaring Kaliningrad a semi-
autonomous or independent region. There is debate within the Russian 
government about how to handle Kaliningrad, with parties divided into 
roughly three camps.
76
 One faction, to which the author believes Premier 
Vladimir Putin and President Dmitry Medvedev most likely ascribe, is 
 
 
 72. Critics might argue that American laws prohibiting gambling or abortions are takings under 
this definition, but to do so is to confuse a fundamental difference between the two types of legislative 
actions. Russia‘s changes to Kaliningrad‘s economic status have no ―social‖ component, whereas it is 
the author‘s opinion that almost every piece of American legislation prohibiting some ―industry‖ is 
done with the intention of protecting society from some form of moral evil. While a limited number of 
people would view ownership of a factory as a moral ―evil,‖ this view is not so prevalent as to 
invalidate the argument that laws (e.g. tax and custom duty structures) affecting the profitability of a 
factory have no moral or social component. 
 73. See infra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 74. KRICKUS, supra note 5, at 94. ―Foreign investors have been denied the opportunity to own 
the land on which their enterprises are located.‖ Id. 
 75. Even if Russia were only to prohibit further acquisitions of land, such an action would 
nonetheless encourage foreigners to divest themselves of their holdings for several reasons. First, 
businesses and industrial operations would not be able to expand in the Oblast. Second, such a change 
could indicate future changes that might result in outright appropriation. Russia has a particularly nasty 
habit of showing preference for foreigners who align ideologically with their current government. For 
example, in the 1920s, American industrialist Armand Hammer, of Arm & Hammer Toothpaste fame, 
was given special privileges in exchange for cooperating with the Soviet regime. As a result, he was 
able to amass a large art collection that was composed chiefly of works confiscated from White 
Russians. Stuart Gold, Occidental Petroleum: Politics, Pollution and Profit, MULTINAT‘L MONITOR, 
July/Aug. 1989, at 43, 43, available at http://multinationalmonitor.org/hyper/issues/1989/07/gold.html. 
 76. For an analysis of the internal debate, see Sergounin, supra note 3, at 3. 
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determined to not see an inch of Russian soil lost to secessionist 
movements or to any other country.
77
 The second would like to see 
Kaliningrad ―become a Russian Hong-Kong, a ‗gateway region‘ that could 
facilitate Russia‘s gradual integration into European multilateral 
institutions.‖78 The third camp sees Kaliningrad achieving some sort of 
semi-autonomy and access to the EU.
79
 While the first camp may currently 
be experiencing a resurgence, it would behoove the Russian government 
and President Medvedev to consider granting Kaliningrad semi-autonomy 
or even full independence before future strains on the Moscow-
Kaliningrad relationship increase the region‘s calls for independence.80  
In addition, Kaliningrad, unlike other remote regions of the Russian 
Federation,
81
 is not endowed with an abundance of natural resources.
82
 
Apart from having ninety percent of the world‘s amber supply,83 the 
region has few other natural resources.
84
 Nor does the region have large-
scale electrical generating facilities;
85
 almost all of its electrical power 
comes from Lithuania via high voltage transmission lines.
86
 Therefore, 
should Russia grant Kaliningrad semi-autonomy, it would not lose any 
 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 4. 
 80. See generally Lachowski, supra note 42.  
 81. Russia is the world‘s largest exporter of natural gas by volume and the second largest 
exporter of oil by volume. Central Intelligence Agency, Natural Gas–Russia, WORLD FACT BOOK, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2183rank.html?countryName=
Russia&countryCode=rs&regionCode=cas&rank=1#rs (last visited Nov. 10, 2009); Central 
Intelligence Agency, Oil—Russia, WORLD FACT BOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/ publications/the-
world-factbook/rankorder/2176rank.html?countryName=Russia&countryCode=rs&regionCode=cas&r
ank=2#rs (last visited Nov. 10, 2009). Roughly seventy percent of Russia‘s oil and ninety percent of its 
natural gas flow from the West Siberian basin, a remote area of Russia. The region is also rich in 
timber, diamonds, gold, coal, fur, copper, and tin. Central Intelligence Agency, Russia, WORLD FACT 
BOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html#Issues (last visited 
Jan. 29, 2009). See also ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., OIL AND GAS RESOURCES OF THE WEST SIBERIAN 
BASIN, RUSSIA 2 (1997), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/analysis_ 
publications/oil_gas_resources_siberian_basin/pdf/rptx.pdf.  
 For a detailed description of the Russian Far East, specifically, Siberia, see Lisa Horner & Josh 
Wilson, Eastern Siberia: Vast Potential, SCHOOL OF RUSSIAN AND ASIAN STUDIES, http://www. 
sras.org/eastern_siberia (last visited Jan. 29, 2009). 
 82. Kaliningrad Region, supra note 11. ―Natural resources include amber, oil, coal, rock salt, 
large peat and water reserves, mineral water, and therapeutic mud.‖ Id. Kaliningrad‘s oil reserves are 
small compared to Russia‘s vast reserves in the Far East. See supra note 81. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See id. 
 85. ―As was the case during the Soviet era, Lithuania continues to play an important part in 
Kaliningrad‘s day-to-day functioning as it still gets 80 percent of its electricity from Lithuania.‖ 
KRICKUS, supra note 5, at 80. 
 86. Id. 
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control over vital resources such as coal, uranium, iron ore, or crude oil as 
is found in its Far Eastern territories.
87
  
While the author believes that making concessions to Kaliningrad 
could increase the secessionist rhetoric from other such regions (such as 
Sakhalin),
88
 the EU, and, consequently, the West, are much more 
concerned with Russia‘s treatment of territories directly in its sphere of 
influence and would not incite upheaval in those other districts. 
Furthermore, a semi-autonomous Kaliningrad would not negatively impact 
Russian strategic interests in the region either, because it would not 
become the territory of a resurgent Germany or a base of operations for 
any other NATO country.
89
 
The Russian Federation would lose little in granting the Kaliningrad 
Oblast semi-autonomous status, while gaining several tangible and 
intangible benefits. Russia would not lose access to valuable commodities 
or the ability to gain revenue from the sale of those assets, nor would it 
lose territory that could easily be defended in the event of a shooting war 
between Russia and Europe—from a national security standpoint, the 
region would be completely indefensible in the event of a Second Cold 
War or Euro-Russian conflict.
90
 Instead, Russia would gain the goodwill 
of the European Union by demonstrating a willingness to integrate itself 
into the world economy as something other than a bully.
91
 While the 
 
 
 87. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 88. Granting semi-autonomy to Kaliningrad might also flare Russian tensions with Estonia, 
where two farms have declared themselves an independent ―Soviet Republic.‖ Mindy Belz, Russian 
Reprise, WORLD, Sept. 20, 2008, at 11. 
 89. Russia‘s strategic interests with respect to Kaliningrad focus almost strictly upon the use of 
the region as a base from which a hostile nation or alliance (historically Germany, but now including 
NATO) could launch an assault on Russia proper. KRICKUS, supra note 5, at 58–61. Thus, Moscow 
has sought to use the area as a renewed buffer zone, much like the Soviet satellite state system of the 
Cold War. Id. at 58. While a fully independent Kaliningrad might one day seek entry into the EU or 
NATO, the issue is much too far in the future for Russia to consider at this time. Additionally, 
considering the ethnic background of Kaliningraders, it takes a fertile imagination to envision a 
country using Kaliningrad as a base from which to invade Russia. 
World War II had demonstrated to Soviet defense planners that control of former East Prussia 
was a critical military asset for the Soviet Union. This was not a new idea since it had its 
origins in the policies of Peter the Great early in the eighteenth century, but it was in the 
twentieth century that Russian defense planners would truly recognize this fact. A military 
bastion in Kaliningrad would deny enemy forces a strategic base from which the Germans 
launched strikes against Leningrad and Moscow in 1941.  
Id. at 58 (summarizing Russia‘s strategic interests in the Kaliningrad region). 
 90. Sergounin, supra note 3, at 1. 
 91. In the past two years Russia has acted as a bully to both its Eastern European and Caucasus 
neighbors as well as to the EU in general. See Estonian President Warns Russia’s President to Stop 
Bullying Its Neighbors, RIA NOVOSTI, Apr. 3, 2009, http://en.rian.ru/world/20090403/120910969. 
html. Most recently, Russia cut off natural gas shipments to the EU through Ukraine. While Russia 
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Russian Baltic Fleet is headquartered in Kaliningrad, semi-autonomous 
status would not necessarily affect the Russian Navy‘s ability to use 
Kaliningrad‘s port facilities.92 The Russian Federation would still have 
access to a warm water port in the Baltic,
93
 but it would not be responsible 
for maintaining a defensive force in a region that basic military strategy 
and tactics make utterly indefensible—i.e., the fact that it is surrounded by 
two NATO countries, lacks geographic features that make defense easy, 
and must be re-supplied by air (through enemy airspace) or convoys down 
 
 
was motivated in part by legitimate price disputes, some view the shut-off as a power play by the 
Russian government to demonstrate its control over Eastern Europe‘s energy supplies. See Yuriy 
Humber & Halia Pavliva, Russia Proposes EU Companies Share Transit Gas Costs, BLOOMBERG 
NEWS, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601110&sid=aNyQ5jSccZAg (discussing the 
gas dispute as of January 16, 2009) (last visited Jan. 16, 2009). A July 2008 article outlining a 
maritime strategy for the United States in the coming decade in the U.S. Naval Institute‘s publication, 
Proceedings, identified Russia‘s ―use of energy as an economic weapon.‖ Vice Admiral Sandy 
Winnefeld, U.S. NAVY, Maritime Strategy in an Age of Blood and Belief, PROC., July 2008, at 20, 22.  
 Russia‘s leadership argues that Russia is not using energy as a weapon, but is merely attempting 
to bring oil and natural gas prices in line with market valuations. Russia Does Not Use Oil and Gas As 
Political Weapons—Putin-1, Feb. 1, 2007, RIA NOVOSTI, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070201/60044654. 
html. In the future, Russia could use energy as a weapon to prevent military responses to further 
aggression in the Caucasus and even in the Baltic. 
 92. Supra notes 89 and 90. Russia would likely not agree to the creation of a semi-autonomous 
Kaliningrad without the right to use naval facilities in the region. Further, Russian control of 
Kaliningrad‘s naval facilities would be difficult in the event of a hot war (e.g., World War II) with the 
EU, NATO, or the United States. Kaliningrad would be in a similar situation as was the German naval 
outpost at Tsingtao (Qingdao) at the beginning of World War I. That outpost surrendered to Japanese 
forces after a short siege and spent the rest of the war under Japanese control. For a detailed account of 
the siege of Tsingtao and the similarity of the outpost‘s situation to Kaliningrad, see CHARLES 
BURDICK BURTON, THE JAPANESE SIEGE OF TSINGTAU: WORLD WAR I IN ASIA (1976). Burton‘s book 
is a compilation of German and Japanese sources and is the best work available on the subject. The 
work remains very readable thirty years after its publication. 
 The argument that a semi-autonomous or independent Kaliningrad would deprive Russia of a 
warm water Baltic naval base is a red herring. Russia could still maintain a force there in peacetime, 
but would be unable to do so during a hot war regardless of who had de jure control of Kaliningrad.  
 93. Many of Imperial Russia‘s expansionist aims can be explained through the lens of a desire 
for a warm water port. Due to Russia‘s geographical location, Russia-proper has no European port 
facilities that remain ice-free year round. GlobalSecurity.org, The Russian Quest for Warm Water 
Ports, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/warm-water-port.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 
2009) [hereinafter Russian Quest]. 
 Ice-free naval facilities are incredibly important for the maintenance of a naval fleet, as well as for 
the ability to effectively project military power overseas. Id. Alfred Thayer Mahan‘s The Influence of 
Seapower Upon History 1660–1763, published in 1890, is perhaps the most seminal work on the 
subject of the importance of projecting naval power abroad. Because it lacked a warm water port, 
Imperial Russia engaged in an expansionist policy to gain access either to a Baltic or Black Sea port. 
The Crimean War, for instance, was fought largely for port facilities on the Black Sea. Russian Quest, 
supra. 
 By the same token, Josef Stalin‘s decision to maintain the Kaliningrad region as Soviet territory 
and not to merge it with one of its satellite countries was motivated by a desire to maintain naval 
facilities at Baltisjk in the Baltic Sea. Id. The Baltisjk port facilities gave the Soviet Navy an ice-free 
port year round from which surveillance submarines could sortie and guided missile destroyers could 
watch over the Baltic Sea, which effectively became a Soviet lake during the Cold War. Id. 
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the narrow Baltic Sea past several potential enemy navies. The Russian 
Federation could also still benefit from tax receipts or lease payments if it 
required these benefits as conditions to conferring Kaliningrad‘s semi-
autonomous status. 
Granting Kaliningrad semi-autonomy or full independence would also 
give President Medvedev a way to ease the tensions that flared in response 
to the August 2007 resumption of strategic bomber flights;
94
 joint 
exercises in 2008 with the Venezuelan Navy;
95
 training exercises by two 
nuclear attack submarines off the East Coast of the United States in 
August 2009;
96
 and, its most egregious action to date, the August 2008 
invasion of Georgia.
97
 In essence, granting Kaliningrad semi-autonomy or 
full independence would create goodwill for the Medvedev 
administration.
98
 Russia could use this goodwill to patch relations with the 
West, as a bargaining chip in its ongoing energy price disputes with 
Eastern Europe and the EU,
99
 or even to weaken the reaction to its next 
incursion into a Caucasus or Balkan nation.
100
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tu-160.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2009). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
An ancient Baltic legend speaks of Winetha,
101
 a city imbued with 
immense beauty and commercial power that disappeared beneath the 
waves of the Baltic Sea as punishment for its citizens‘ sins.102 According 
to the legend, on calm days sailors can see the city with its ―silver 
ramparts and marble columns‖103 and, once a year, on Good Friday, 
Winetha rises intact from the waves only to sink back into the murky 
depths at the end of the day.
104
  
The creation of a semi-autonomous or independent Kaliningrad could 
turn this myth into reality by restoring what was once the crown jewel of 
Prussia
105
 to its former glory.
106
 The people of Kaliningrad should be given 
the opportunity, via plebiscite, to determine their own destiny, whether it 
be independence, semi-autonomy as a republic within the Russian 
Federation, or continued second-class citizenship.
107
 Being semi-
autonomous or independent would allow Kaliningrad to shed itself of the 
baggage it still carries from two of the most evil empires in the modern 
era. A multi-ethnic Kaliningrad Republic could become the Hong Kong of 
Eastern Europe, bringing prosperity and freedom to a people and a region 
that has seen little of either in the past eighty years. 
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